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Resonances from Economic Development for Current Economic 
Policymaking 
 
 
1.  Introduction1 
 
On November 25 1958, an article in the Irish Times stated that the publication of 
Economic Development was a unique event, because for the first time, an Irish 
Government has revealed in full detail the view put to it on the whole range of 
economic policies by its principal adviser, the Secretary of the Department of 
Finance. The (unnamed) journalist went on to note that in its Programme for 
Economic Expansion, published ahead of Economic Development, the Government 
had endorsed most of its content, and in particular, the suggestion of allocating more 
State investment to support productive enterprise. He further noted that the new 
productive investment would be superimposed on top of the existing socially-oriented 
programmes – in other words, there was no plan for a major reallocation of existing 
public resources. The article also recognised that the plan was not perfect but was 
optimistic that any criticisms it might attract would be aimed at making it a better 
plan. The journalist’s tone is one that is empathetic to a country recognising its 
problems and planning to deal with them.   
 
The publication of Economic Development came at a time when Ireland was suffering 
continuously high levels of emigration and unemployment – the twin signals of 
economic failure – while the rest of Europe was booming. Growth rates were very low 
or even negative. Balance of payments deficits were high and rising – reflecting in 
part the decline in Ireland’s trade balance. Crucial messages running through the 
document were that policy needed to promote economic growth as the way to address 
unemployment and emigration, and that economic growth required structural change.    
 
The process whereby economic policy changes direction is a complex one, and while 
there are moments, such as the publication of Economic Development where this 
change is clearly recognised, the reality is that the seeds of change long pre-dated that 
                                                 
1 This Paper was written in early September 2008, when it was already recognised that the Irish 
economy was in recession.  However, it was completed before Ireland entered a period of severe 
financial crisis (linked to the global crisis that began in the USA as the problems of the sub-prime 
mortgages developed) and an exceptionally rapid decline in tax revenues.   
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publication. Then, as now, policy change is about process rather than about the public 
document that discusses the need for change and what it will involve. What was 
exceptional in the mid-1950s was that a group of civil servants and carefully selected 
others put into the public domain their considered view of the real problems that faced 
the Irish economy and identified the changes they thought were required. Allowing 
the publication of a separate document reflected a new maturity on the part of the 
political system, indicating that politicians had confidence in the ability of the civil 
servants to produce an independent and competent analysis of the Irish economy.  It 
also recognised that political decision making could not ignore economic realities.   
 
While the basic analysis in Economic Development was sound, it had an inherently 
static approach (reflecting economic theory of the time), and consequently their 
conclusion that agriculture and food-based industries would be the route to faster 
growth turned out to be wide of the mark.2 It is also not clear whether the implications 
of Keynesian economics for Irish macro policy were fully understood.3 Nonetheless, 
as we would all recognise today, there were three crucial elements in that analysis 
which were absolutely correct:   
 
• An appreciation of the potential benefits of opening up the Irish economy to 
trade and foreign direct investment, and conversely the serious damage that 
would be done to the Irish economy by continuing the twenty-five year old 
policy of combining high levels of protection with a prohibition on foreign 
direct investment;  
 
• Tentative evidence of the usefulness of Keynesian economics to inform the 
role of the State in smoothing economic cycles; and  
 
                                                 
2 The basic logic of the economic understanding was that improvements in technology in agriculture 
would increase its output and hence its purchasing power. This would stimulate further demand for 
goods and services, leading to additional employment in industry and services but no increase in 
agricultural employment. In effect, employment generation would be in manufacturing and tourism. 
This led to the conclusion that: In general, however, it would seem that attention should be 
concentrated primarily on raising the efficiency and volume of production in agriculture and in 
industries based on agriculture. Chapter 2, Para 32. 
3 Several economists have visited this issue, including Patrick Honohan and Cormac Ó Gráda. 
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• A recognition of the significant challenge faced by the public service, with 
scarce resources, trying to plan and deliver policies that would support the 
restructuring necessary to generate higher levels of economic growth. 
 
The French have a saying  – plus ça change, plus ça reste la même – an expression 
which quickly comes to mind in looking at Ireland in 2008, some fifty years later. 
Now, as then, we are still dealing with these same three elements.4 
   
• Openness is an issue today in terms of the challenges and potential generated 
by globalisation (a word that did not even exist in 1958). This openness means 
a continual restructuring of our economy into higher value-added products and 
services and constant pressures for innovation. It also means increasing 
internationalisation of domestic production, if we are to remain globally 
competitive.   
 
• We are now faced again with managing economic cycles with limited 
independent monetary policy instruments, with a growing budget deficit, with 
current fiscal policy constrained both by EU rules, and by having adopted 
what has been described as an ‘accounting’ rather than ‘economic’ approach to 
handling large fiscal surpluses in recent years.5 
   
• We are also faced with determining how best to allocate a tighter capital 
budget, under the National Development Programme, which is intended to 
enhance current and future growth rates. This requires now, as it did in the 
1950s, a stronger culture of planning and evaluation than we have managed to 
achieve in many of the intervening fifty years.6  
 
                                                 
4 Economic Development states that we are at …a critical and decisive point in our economic affairs – 
0an expression that would not go amiss in 2008.   
5 In effect the Keynesian counter-cyclical policy message has been forgotten over recent years, as 
policy has been pro-cyclical, driven by the idea that ‘when you have it, spend it’. 
6 Whatever about the criticisms that can be made about Irish economic policy over the period, in terms 
of its general direction it has been positive overall, though weaker on the Keynesian dimension. The 
benefits of this are very apparent when one comes to compare the successes of economic and social 
policies with the failures of spatial policy. 
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This paper explores some potential resonances for policymaking in Ireland in 2008 by 
examining the links between the approach to economic policymaking in Economic 
Development and those underpinning the National Development Plan 2007-2013: 
Transforming Ireland and NESC Paper No 117:  The Irish Economy in the 21st 
Century.   
 
In Section 2 we look at three sets of economic indicators that highlight how we have 
progressed since the 1950s. These indicators help to place the current challenges in 
perspective. In Section 3 we look briefly at how the policy process has changed over 
the five decades since 1958, while in Section 4 we look at some of the possible 
lessons from Economic Development for the short to medium term.  
 
2.  What Has Changed in the Past Fifty Years?  
 
In this section we look at three sets of economic variables and how they have changed 
over the half century, since Economic Development was published:  
 
1. the state of the economy (in terms of the labour market, economic structure, 
per capita growth and foreign debt);  
2. the state of the public finances (in terms of national debt and interest 
payments) and 
3. the openness of the economy (in terms of what net trade contributes to 
growth).   
 
Labour Market – Unemployment and Emigration 
 
The scale of unemployment and emigration were the two most tangible indicators of 
economic failure in the 1950s. High levels of unemployment meant that many young 
people emigrated and emigration itself set a cap on the size of the unemployment rate. 
The unemployment rate in 1958 was just under 6 per cent and in that year net 
emigration was almost 60,000.7 Leaving emigration aside, the unemployment rate 
                                                 
7 Had those 60,000 not emigrated, the unemployment rate – making the conservative estimate that 50 
per cent of them would have been in the labour force – would have been around 8 per cent.  
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understates the extent of the unemployment problem, as there was massive 
underemployment at the time in agriculture.8   
 
Two features are striking in Figure 1. Firstly, the cyclical pattern of unemployment 
over the fifty years (low (high) during periods of relatively high (low) growth) is 
evident, particularly in the earlier years of this decade. Secondly, the upward trend in 
unemployment from the late 1970s through the 1980s and into the 1990s is very clear. 
The early 1990s was described at the time as having ‘jobless growth’ as the reduction 
in unemployment trailed the growth in output.9 However, as Ireland regained 
international competitiveness, the results predicted by the early ESRI Medium-Term 
Reviews were found to hold – unemployment rates fell rapidly and increasing 
numbers entered the labour force.10 
 
Figure 1:  Unemployment Rates, 1951- 200911  
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Given the openness of the Irish labour market, the unemployment figures have to be 
looked at in the context of net emigration, as shown in Figure 2. While unemployment 
fell in the years following the publication of Economic Development, net emigration 
                                                 
8 The underemployment was implicitly recognised in Economic Development, which saw output 
growth potential in agriculture if it modernised, but no employment growth potential.   
9 See Guiomard (1994). 
10 The source of the addition to the labour force was increased female participation and returned 
migrants. 
11 The estimates for unemployment for 2008 and 2009 come from the ESRI Quarterly Economic 
Commentary, Summer 2008. 
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remained relatively high and it was 1972 before the switch occurred between net 
emigration and net immigration. Net immigration peaked at 20,000 in the mid-1970s, 
seeming to confirm Ireland’s potential sustainability as an economic region in the face 
of increasingly open labour markets.12 The sensitivity of migrant flows to conditions 
in the Irish and UK markets became apparent again in the mid-1980s as net 
emigration rose quickly, peaking at over 40,000 in 1989. Ireland experienced levels of 
net immigration in recent years that were not just unprecedented historically but, in 
terms of scale, were unprecedented internationally. The recent drop in immigration 
and the likely switch to net emigration in 2009 are clear evidence of both the mobility 
f labour to changing economic circumstances and the globalisation of labour.  
e now turn to look at jobs and their 
ectoral allocation over the period since 1961. 
                                                
o
 
Figure 2: Net Migration 1955-200913 
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12 Most the immigrants were returning emigrants from the 1960s with their families.  
13 The estimates for migration in 2008 and 2009 come from the ESRI Quarterly Economic 
Commentary, Summer 2008. 
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Changing Economic Structure and Growth 
 
Figure 3 allows us to look at both employment change and the change in economic 
structure since 1961. We look at four broad sectors – agriculture, industry, market 
services and non-market services.14 The hope expressed in Economic Development 
was that industrial employment would grow significantly, supported by the growth in 
agricultural output but not employment. Marketed services featured very modestly in 
e 1991.  Such an increase was un-
inkable in 1991, let alone 1961, and suggests that inappropriate policies had stood in 
16
                                                
Economic Development, with tourism being the only traded service meriting attention.  
 
The most striking feature of Figure 3 is that employment has almost doubled since 
1961, and that most of this change occurred sinc 15
th
the way of economic and employment growth.  
 
Figure 3: Sectoral Growth and Composition of Employment, 1961-2007 (various 
years) 
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Linking back to the unemployment and migration data in Figures 1 and 2, we see that 
between 1961 and 1971 there was almost no change in employment numbers but 
 
14 Non-market services are primarily government services which are provided outside the market 
system. 
15 The population grew by 25 per cent in 1961-1991 and 20 per cent in 1991-2006.   
16 This issue has been a topic of much research in Ireland – see for example, Barry (1999) and Honohan 
and Walsh (2002). 
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considerable reallocation across sectors – in effect the numbers released from 
agriculture were just about being absorbed in the other three sectors, with the largest 
share moving into industry. In the 1971-81 decade, during which Ireland entered the 
EU, total employment grew by 9 per cent. Despite the huge boost to Irish agriculture 
under the Common Agricultural Policy, the share of agriculture in employment 
continued to decline, while the share of non-market services rose very considerably. 
In the decade 1981-1991, aggregate employment fell slightly, with non-market 
services holding their share while employment transferred out of both agriculture and 
industry into marketed services. The decade 1991-2001 saw total employment grow at 
a remarkable rate of just under 50 per cent – from 1.1 million to 1.6 million. Industrial 
employment grew in numbers but not in share while there was substantial growth in 
both types of services. In the period since 2001 the most striking change has been the 
increase in non-market services employment by almost 40 per cent (to 476,000).  
Employment in market services increased by 23 per cent to almost 860,000 as the 
ombination of domestic growth for services and the international tradability of 
 
 1990s was clearly ‘off-scale’, and in part 
flected the growth that should have come earlier had we not incurred the economic 
mistakes of the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
 
c
services led to a significant expansion in this sector. 
 
Figure 4 shows the growth in GNP and in per capita GNP since 1958.   Three features 
of this Figure merit comment.  First, it is clear that we have had cyclical growth
patterns over the past fifty years – if we learn anything from the past, we must surely 
learn that growth rates are not constant and we should expect variation across years.   
Second, we see that on either side of the disastrous 1980s, we had relatively high 
growth.  The growth in the latter half of the
re
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Figure 4: Growth in GNP and GNP Per Capita 
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
GNP % GNPPC Growth Rate %
 
 Third, the differences in the GNP growth rate and the GNP growth rate per capita are 
quite striking – the latter is what really matters from a welfare/quality of life point of 
view. Except for the period known for ‘jobless growth’, GNP rose faster than GNP 
per capita.17 The growing gap between the two reflects the growth in population over 
the recent period and is also consistent with more slowly rising productivity. Clearly 
the growth rates for 2008 and 2009 will represent a significant change on what we 
have experienced in the period up to 2008. 
 
Foreign Debt   
 
A recurrent theme throughout Economic Development was the level of foreign 
government debt and the extent to which it was a drain on domestic resources. Figure 
5 shows Government Foreign Debt Interest Payments as a percentage of Tax Revenue 
and of GDP. While debt service was an expressed concern in Economic Development, 
looking at the period since 1960, we see that debt service costs relative to GDP were 
quite low at that time and remained so until the mid-1970s. The ratio rose rapidly after 
that period, reflecting the scale of borrowing, the high rates of interest and low rates 
of GDP growth. The effect of rising GDP and access to low interest rates in relation to 
monetary union saw the ratio fall dramatically from 1995, so that it now accounts for 
                                                 
17 See Guiomard (1995). 
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little more than half of 1 per cent of GDP.18 However, this indicator is no longer 
important since we entered the Euro Area.   
 
From a government perspective, what matters is its capacity to pay the interest and so 
we look at the foreign interest payments relative to tax revenue. We can see that in the 
period from 1982 to 1995 foreign interest payments were over 6 per cent of tax 
revenue and as high at 10 per cent in three of those years. Today’s ratio is rising very 
rapidly but is still far less than those high rates. What is worth noting, however, is 
how quickly the ratio rose in the 1970s and fell in the 1990s. The latter fall was driven 
strongly by the strength of exchequer associated with rapid economic growth. This 
change is reflected in Figure 6, which covers the period since 1975 only. 
 
While interest payments continued to increase right throughout the 1980s, the 
Exchequer Borrowing Requirement was in fact falling, and it, together with the 
General Government Deficit were actually negative for many years in the past decade.  
This pattern set its own challenges for government in that, with large-scale 
infrastructural and other deficits, it was under severe pressure to relax the budgetary 
and efficiency constraints that a tighter fiscal environment would have created.    
 
Figure 5: Government Foreign Debt Interest Payment to Tax Revenue and GDP, 
1960-2005   
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18 It should be noted, however, that private debt has risen dramatically in the past decade. 
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Figure 6: Exchequer Borrowing Requirement and General Government Deficit  
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Trade and Growth  
 
It is well known that Ireland now has one of the most open economies in the world, as 
measured in terms of its ratio of traded goods/services to GDP/GNP.19 The openness 
is a product of our pro-trade policy (going back to the 1960s and advocated strongly 
in Economic Development), the scale of our domestic market (whose relatively small 
size does not allow economies of scale in production without sales into international 
markets), and the large share of Irish business that is foreign-owned. In effect, our 
engagement with international markets has contributed very positively to recent 
economic growth, and as a country, Ireland has benefits very significantly from the 
further integration of Europe brought about by the addition of new members states 
and the reduction in cross-border barriers to economic activity under the Single 
Market Programme.  
 
Figure 7 decomposes growth into domestic and external sources. The pattern shows 
that if we ignore foreign markets and the need to be competitive, we do so at our peril.  
We now see that the growth driven by internal factors only cannot be sustained and 
for us to grow at our (supply-driven) potential over the coming decade, we need to 
                                                 
19 Ireland ranked first place in terms of the AT Kearney Globalisation Index for several years since 
2000. 
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ensure that the contribution to growth from external factors remains positive.20 A 
further message from this figure is that external trade growth is highly volatile – an 
unavoidable consequence of being engaged in the global economy. This consequence 
was recognised with stunning bluntness in Economic Development.21 
 
 Figure 7: Internal/External Sources Contributing to Growth, 1962-2006  
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These seven charts show that while we have made extraordinary progress since 1958, 
the path of development has been very uneven. While external factors contributed 
strongly to the unevenness, the way in which we have exercised policy has also 
contributed to the uneven growth pattern.  To illustrate the cost of adopting pro- rather 
than counter-cyclical policies, just think how different Ireland would look if it had 
grown at the average rate of the whole period.22 Might it have been possible with a 
better policy process to have avoided the infrastructure and fiscal crises, the 
mismanagement of the health system, the unstructured growth of higher education and 
the very costly labour market disruptions? 
 
 
                                                 
20 This is a recurrent message in the ESRI’s Medium-Term Reviews. 
21 Economic Development states this very succinctly: Our imports and exports can fluctuate in an 
embarrassing way. Chapter 4, Para 19. 
22 This is a very useful thought experiment for any economy, and particularly Ireland, given the striking 
contrasts between the 1980s and 1990s. 
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3. Policy Process  
 
In this section we explore some elements of the policy process from Economic 
Development and relate them to the current process of economic policymaking in 
Ireland.   
As noted above, the separation of the government’s programme from the analysis of 
the economy by civil servants and other specialists was a major event for Ireland. In a 
sense the publication of Economic Development recognised, perhaps for the first time 
in Ireland, the technical requirements for sound economic management. It would 
appear that prior to 1958 economic policy had been driven strongly by political 
ideology, involving little input from economics expertise per se, and the civil service 
role was simply to administer the policies associated with that ideology.23 Discussion 
of the reason for the change at that time is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it 
is important to recognise that the publication of civil service documents of this type 
and scale was not the norm in Ireland or elsewhere at the time.24 In effect, while the 
government’s perspective and policies were reflected in its Programme for Economic 
Expansion, it was prepared to put into the public domain the independent analysis of 
Ireland’s problems and opportunities by a group of what some might call 
‘technocrats’. This might be seen as an early example of transparency in national 
policymaking anywhere.  
 
As a document, Economic Development subscribed to the principle of being as 
evidence-based25 as possible and acknowledged some outside influences.26 
Subsequent history would suggest that the strong support by T.K. Whitaker and his 
department for the establishment of the Economic and Social Research Institute 
(ESRI) reflected an acknowledgement that the amount of evidence available to inform 
                                                 
23 The ideology was characterised by a protectionist trade policy and policies to conserve the positions 
of key vested interest groups, with no real appreciation of the damage these policies were doing to the 
country’s economy. 
24 While there were expert documents produced on specific issues – such as emigration and banking – 
there were no expert documents produced on the system as a whole. The importance of the systemic 
approach to policy is that is demonstrates publicly the need for trade-offs in policy choices.   
25 Chapter 1 states that: The mind needs the support of facts and figures, an approach supported by the 
Chair of the Group and by the inclusion of the Head of the Central Statistics Office as a member. 
26 Frank Barry discusses this issue in his paper to this conference. The full influences are not 
acknowledged in the document – the Introduction mentioned just two individuals – Sir Alec Cairncross 
and Bishop Philbin of Raphoe. This is in stark contrast with NESC Paper 117, which includes several 
pages of academic references and agency reports.  
 
 
14 
policymaking was limited.27 In essence there were three elements to Economic 
Development: 
 
1. The first element was a thorough analysis of the Irish economy, at an 
aggregate and a sectoral level, in terms of deficiencies and the principles that 
needed to be invoked to correct them.  
 
2. The second element was the focus on Ireland’s potential: What exactly could 
be achieved if the right policies were in place? By how much could growth 
increase so that we would catch up with our European neighbours? What is 
perhaps not fully appreciated is that the importance of competitiveness as an 
essential prerequisite for realising this potential was recognised in 1958.28 
 
3. The third element was the use of a ten-year perspective in framing policy, 
combined with the identification of the national capital programme as the key 
policy instrument. In context we must recognise that this was a long timeframe 
for a country that was then less than forty years old. We should note that it was 
closer to a perspective rather than a rigid plan, reflecting an awareness of the 
large external influences over which Ireland would have no control.29 Again 
this provided evidence of Ireland’s growing maturity and the imminent 
shedding of protectionist policies.   
 
If we were to look today at a parallel for the policy process implicit in the preparation 
of Economic Development, we would find the three elements in different places:   
 
1. Increasingly the current view of the economy, how it works and in particular 
the link between the economy and society, is now encapsulated in documents 
produced by the National Economic and Social Council (NESC). Its most 
                                                 
27 T.K. Whitaker played an exceptionally active role in persuading the Ford Foundation to provide the 
initial funding for the ESRI, while RC Geary played a pivotal role in attracting leading international 
researchers to come to the Institute since there was a dearth of empirical economists in Ireland at the 
time. 
28 For example, Economic Development states: If we do not expand production on a competitive basis, 
we shall fail to provide the basis necessary for the economic independence and material progress of the 
community.  
29 It also recognised an ambiguity towards economic planning at the time, as Eastern European 
communism was seen as being ‘plan-centric’ in its approach.  
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recent document, NESC Paper No 117: The Irish Economy in the 21st Century 
is informed by a range of influences, and some or all of these are duly 
acknowledged in the bibliography. This represents a big change compared 
with 1958.  The ‘technocratic view’ in Economic Development has been 
replaced by a ‘consensual view’ agreed by the social partners, informed by the 
NESC Secretariat drawing on a range of policy documents produced by and 
for government departments and agencies. The link between NESC, Social 
Partnership and the Department of An Taoiseach also means that the role of 
the Department of Finance in this context seems to be quite different to what it 
was in 1958. It is not evident how significant a role the Department of An 
Taoiseach, qua Department, played in the production of Economic 
Development. 
 
2. In terms of looking at Ireland’s potential, the ESRI’s Medium-Term Review 
(MTR), based on a two/three year cycle, is the main instrument for exploring, 
within a global context, what is possible if we manage the economy well and 
continue to be competitive.  The global context is now more complex and the 
modelling is much more complex, but the overlap between the issues explored 
in key chapters of Economic Development and in a typical MTR is very 
striking, e.g., competitiveness, growing productivity, public sector efficiency, 
control of public sector pay. 
 
3. In terms of the ten-year perspective, this is now much more developed than it 
was and has been implemented through our sequence of National 
Development Plans since 1989. These plans are produced in a more ‘bottom 
up’ way than the Whitaker plan in 1958, with Departments providing inputs 
and other institutions and agencies, including the ESRI, assisting the 
Department of Finance in drawing a coherent plan together.30 Furthermore, 
today’s plans have substantial resources attached to them, in contrast with the 
1958 plan, which relied totally on the funds available in annual budgets for 
                                                 
30 An interesting issue for economic historians is how we came to abandon the approach adopted in the 
First, Second and Third Programmes for Economic Expansion in the early 1970s, only returning to 
such planning type documents under the requirements of the EU structural funds in the late 1980s.   
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implementation. They also incorporate a more structured multi-annual 
approach.   
 
By international standards, it could be said that Irish economic policymaking is 
exceptionally mature in the extent to which it takes a long-term view – something that 
can be linked back to Economic Development. In effect, long-term economic 
development issues, and even the policies put in place, tend to run above politics in 
Ireland. Indeed taking politics out of serious economic crises was central to the Irish 
Inc approach adopted in solving the disastrous problems of the mid-late 1980s.31   
Arguably we are currently back in such a position today. 
 
The preparation of large-scale planning documents means that the annual budget is 
less important to the direction of policy now than it was in the 1980s. Indeed, 
arguably its main role is to manage economic cycles, which (from a Keynesian 
perspective) means reducing public expenditure during a boom period and vice verse 
during a recession. The importance of planning in the Irish policy process means that 
we take it for granted that the current NDP should be rationally-based and should run 
beyond the life of the present government, lest these longer-term policy perspectives 
be eroded by the ‘political business cycle’.32 That said, there would be widespread 
agreement that the scale though not the general direction of the current plan was not 
independent of the political cycle. In a rational economic framework, the scale of the 
plan should match both the absorption capacity of the economy itself33 and its ability 
to deliver that without undermining the structure of the economy.  It should also take 
account of the capacity of the public sector system to deliver the projects and 
programmes at the standards of evaluation and monitoring to which it has committed, 
while the precise roll-out of the plan would reflect the demand management context.34   
 
                                                 
31 In effect the Tallaght Strategy allowed Ireland to re-engage in rational policymaking, without which 
the prosperity of the 1990s would not have occurred.   
32 This is required to avoid the ‘damaging inconsistencies and conflicts’ noted in Economic 
Development.  
33 For example, the ability of the higher education system to expand its research output without 
reducing the quality of the undergraduate education system it offers, or the construction industry to 
provide infrastructure at cost levels that allow a real return on capital for the State.  
34 The commitment of the Department of Finance to high quality evaluation and monitoring is set out in 
presentations by David Doyle (2004) and Jim O’Brien (2007) to annual conferences of the Irish 
Evaluation Network. 
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A distinct difference between Economic Development and the current NESC and NDP 
documents is the dominant focus on sectors in Economic Development compared with 
a more ‘market-focused’ approach, in terms of both products and factor markets, in 
the NESC and NDP documents. In fact, the focus on joined-up thinking at this level 
has moved well beyond where it started in 1958, and there is now a greater 
appreciation that sectors contain heterogeneous enterprises that interact differently 
with the market, and that markets respond to relative price changes. Furthermore, 
while it may well not have been the case, reading Economic Development one has a 
sense of its authors not quite believing in markets, in terms of their resource allocation 
potential.  Implicitly direct government intervention was seen as the driver of change. 
Indeed one of the great changes in Ireland in the past couple of decades is a slowly 
growing awareness of the way markets operate – whether it is the market for 
university places (through the points system), for air-travel or for housing. The 
sectoral focus in the current documents is on internationally-traded services and on 
high-tech manufacturing, and the ways in which these connect with the markets for 
skilled labour and technology. By contrast the sectoral discussion in Economic 
Development was dominated by agriculture,35 where policy interventions were 
described at an extraordinary level of detail, while there was virtually no detail 
available on the manufacturing or service sectors.36 There are lengthy discussions on 
capital availability in Economic Development, a focus that is almost entirely absent 
from recent documents, reflecting no doubt the integration of Ireland into global 
capital markets. 
 
A striking similarity between Economic Development and the NESC/NDP documents 
is the importance all attach to competitiveness and the dangers of ignoring it. This is 
ultimately about recognising long-term economy-wide interests and setting these 
above short-term vested interests. To some it might appear that Ireland only 
                                                 
35 The dominance of agriculture derives from the conclusion that: In general, however it would seem 
that attention should be concentrated primarily on raising the efficiency and volume of production in 
agriculture and in industries based on agriculture. The only real mention of services is in relation to 
tourism about which there is quite some discussion because of its perceived importance as a foreign 
exchange earner. 
36 The absence of discussion on manufacturing, which in the subsequent three decades was to become 
the major engine of economic growth, was in part due to the absence of hard or soft data on the sector. 
The latter was to be rectified to some degree by the development of CSO data and the reports produced 
by the Committees for Industrial Organisation (CIOs) that were set up in the 1960s to explore how the 
industrial sector needed to prepare for free trade. 
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discovered competitiveness as an issue in the 1990s – as symbolised in the 
establishment of the National Competitiveness Council.  However, this is not true as 
Economic Development is full of statements pointing to its importance in 1958, 
starting with the statement: Our level of real incomes depends on our competitive 
efficiency37 in Chapter 1 and later stating: If we do not expand production on a 
competitive basis, we shall fail to provide the basis necessary for the economic 
independence and material progress of the community.   And, in a statement that is as 
relevant today was it was in 1958, we find in Economic Development:  Economic 
Expansion could be seriously hindered both by restrictive practices on the part of 
trade unions and by insistence on frequent and indiscriminate increases in wages and 
salaries exceeding any benefit from increases in productivity and causing a general 
rise in production costs.38   
 
4. Lessons for the Short to Medium Term 
 
Before looking at potential lessons from 1958 for today, let us focus briefly on the 
ways in which the economy is different from what it was in 1958.   
 
Openness: While Economic Development stressed the importance of greater openness, 
the extent of openness today is much greater. This means that we get greater upswings 
from international growth but we also get correspondingly greater downswings.39 
Furthermore, the economy today is much more globally diversified – where in 1958 
most trade and factor mobility was between Ireland and the UK, today our 
international relationships are much stronger with mainland Europe and with the 
USA. Clearly the extent of integration between Ireland and other EU countries is 
completely different now from what it was in 1958.  Furthermore, the extent of 
integration of the two countries on the island of Ireland is obviously much greater 
now. 
 
                                                 
37 See Chapter 1, Page 2. 
38 See Chapter 3, Para 14. 
39 We are extremely conscious of the latter today, having enjoyed the benefits of many years of 
upswing in the past two decades. 
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Growth Engine: Whereas in 1958 the economy did not have a growth engine, we 
potentially have one today, centred on high-tech internationally-traded manufacturing 
and services.40 However, the growth engine is mainly found in foreign-owned 
enterprises, and, despite recent reports, we are still a considerable distance away from 
having large numbers of strong internationally-trading indigenous businesses. We 
ignore at our peril our dependence on these foreign-owned enterprises, and the need to 
provide a competitive environment in which they can prosper. Of particular concern 
here, and similar to 1958, is the poor productivity performance in many parts of 
indigenous manufacturing, even in those enterprises that are exporting.41   
 
Human Capital: Ireland’s level of human capital in the 1950s was very low and 
increasing slowly.  This contrasted with the rest of Europe, where secondary 
education was the norm, and where larger proportions of the population were 
continuing on to post-secondary education. Today our participation levels are much 
higher at senior secondary and at tertiary levels but lag way behind our OECD 
comparator countries at the fourth (PhD/research) levels – a level not even envisaged 
in Economic Development.   
 
Role of the Market: Whereas in 1958 there was no confidence in the role of markets 
to reorient development, there is, as noted above, much more recognition today that 
markets do work. Consumer and business people now see that: if airlines42 and inter-
city buses are de-regulated, better service and lower prices result; if prices are 
uncompetitive, producers lose market share; if wage costs are too high, employment 
falls; if charges are levied on plastic bags, shoppers move to alternatives. That having 
been said, the lack of confidence in markets remains a weakness in Ireland, with a 
tendency to presume that government must intervene in some areas where the market 
can do the job much better. Furthermore, we need to address the failure of certain 
                                                 
40 To the extent that there was a growth engine in the 1950s, it was in the agricultural sector. 
41 Recent research on indigenous manufacturing shows a productivity performance that does not 
indicate potential for rapid output growth or for large increases in pay.  See Gleeson and Ruane (2008). 
42 For example, while tourism was the only service sector that received attention in Economic 
Development, there was no mention of the cost of getting onto the island which remained high until 
Ryanair entered the market in the late 1980s. 
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publicly provided services, such as urban buses, to provide a good service to Irish 
consumers.43   
 
Public-Sector Efficiency: While there is some recognition in Economic Development 
of the need for increasing public sector efficiency, there is greater recognition of that 
need today and very slowly growing recognition that in a knowledge society more 
specialised skills are needed within the civil and public service. While there is the 
commitment to increased efficiency in the public service, evidence of real reform 
remains to be seen.44 There is considerable cost, in terms of economic growth, of 
having a public sector that is relatively costly and not properly resourced to deliver 
services efficiently.  A further source of risk is the dependence on consultants for 
technical and specialist knowledge.   
 
Growth Potential: Whereas in 1958, there was little confidence that we could achieve 
a better equilibrium, with lower unemployment and no involuntary emigration, today 
we know that it is possible – and this should provide the confidence needed for taking 
the tough decisions necessary to deal with our current difficulties.  
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - 
Reflecting on Economic Development, reviewing recent government publications on 
the economy, and bearing in mind the challenges faced by policymakers in the present 
fiscal climate, several observations come to mind. 
 
Competitiveness Matters: Ireland’s success in turning the economy around in the past 
came from growth through international trade and internationally mobile investment. 
The lesson, which Economic Development recognised in 1958 but that is periodically 
forgotten, is clear – Ireland cannot succeed if it is not globally competitive. No one, 
neither government, nor employers, nor trade-unions, nor consumers can simply ‘wish 
away’ that economic reality – if they try to do this, history shows that the country 
loses. For example, Economic Development suggests that if the competitiveness level 
is lower than Europe, then living standards must be lower. It goes on to recognise that 
                                                 
43 This continues despite publications like Better Regulation and the advice of the OECD to the Irish 
government.  
44 See OECD (2008) 
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lower living standards are only acceptable as part of a programme of national 
regeneration. This conclusion is as relevant in 2008 as it was in 1958 and in 1987. 
Anticipating the type of situation we currently face, Chapter 3 Para 14 notes that: The 
success of any policy of economic development will depend on the effective and 
continuous cooperation of the trade unions in promoting increased productivity and 
in avoiding increases in wages and salaries which would injure export prospects.  So 
the message for today is clear – Ireland must win back its competitiveness and that 
means starting with a pay policy that does not raise public sector costs or does not 
reduce private sector employment.  In today’s climate, this may mean a review of the 
current levels of public sector pay and whether they impede economic recovery and 
longer term prosperity. 
 
Economic Cycles Happen: Economic cycles are a fact of life – they happen again and 
again and we must continuously plan with this in mind. Our experience, from time to 
time, of long periods of sustained growth in our major markets, such as in the 1990s, 
should not cause us to forget this. Government needs to operate counter-cyclical 
policies and thus be ready for a downturn – it should not be taken by surprise when 
the inevitable happens. Strong global competitiveness means that the impact of a 
downturn can be moderated, but this is not the situation Irish business faces in 2008, 
where the economy has lost international competitiveness in recent years, and recent 
policies have been pro-cyclical.  
 
Thus in today’s difficult climate, flexibility is needed on both sides of the table in the 
business sector – employers and senior managers must recognise that ability-to-pay 
constraints apply just as much, and arguably much more, to their salaries and bonuses 
as they do to those of their lower paid employees. If financial viability is to be 
assured, flexibility in the face of a recession should cover all dimensions of a 
company’s operations: numbers of employees at all levels up to the highest 
management levels, remuneration rates for employers/ employees, work practices at 
all levels, returns to the owners of the companies, etc. Inevitably this means greater 
efforts in monitoring resources and managing staff than in a boom period. The greater 
the flexibility, the more likely a private sector company and its employees are to 
weather the recession and recover when it is over.  
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 The situation in the public sector is somewhat similar to that section of the private 
sector that is protected from market competition.45 There is no market threat to 
generate pressure for flexibility. So if revenues are down in the public sector, what 
happens? Historically if wages continue to increase rather than stay constant or fall 
and if work practices are slow to change, the only flexibility that government has as 
an employer is to reduce output, i.e., reduce the scale of programmes it supports or 
reduce the quality of services it provides directly to the public, with the latter linked to 
not replacing those who leave (retire from) the sector. This is clearly a much lower 
degree of flexibility than found in the globally-trading private sector, and it calls us to 
question the ability of public sector to be able to manage a strong econo0mic 
downturn such as we have in 2008/9.  It raises the question of whether it is possible to 
continue with a situation where some individuals (i.e., those in the public sector and 
the private sector that face no global competition) suffer much less than those in 
sectors facing global competition when the international economy is in recession. In 
the absence of downward pay adjustments in the public sector and the protected 
private sector, the potential recipients/consumers of the services of these sectors will 
suffer.   
 
Finally, it is worth noting that while we have benefited very considerably from being 
part of the Euro Area, one consequence of this is that it restricts our use of monetary 
instruments.46 It points to the importance of getting fiscal and incomes policies right, 
and of using such monetary controls as we have effectively. Indeed Economic 
Development provides some very pertinent advice in this regard – concluding a 
discussion on banking it notes: …the exercise of financial responsibility may require 
unpopular measures of restriction as often as it admits of liberality and expansion.47  
So the message for today is that we would do well to recognise the power of 
economic cycles, and act accordingly. This means recognising the cost of operating 
pro-cyclical policies in recent years and planning our way out of this present situation 
in a long-term systematic way – revising decisions and re-prioritising as needed. In 
essence, the development plans we have in place set out a general direction and if this 
                                                 
45 The protection may be through past or current regulation or through the absence of an active 
competition policy in the past.    
46 This is nothing new historically and rather similar to the situation in 1958 when we were parity-
linked to £-sterling. 
47 See Chapter 3 Para 18. 
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direction is correct, the cycle does not change the direction but merely the pace of 
development. However, if the plans contain elements that do not stand up to scrutiny 
on closer inspection, then the present downturn provides an opportunity to revisit 
these elements with a more critical mindset.  
 
Adaptability is Essential.  The ability of people to adapt quickly to changing 
situations is vital to competitiveness and ultimately to economic prosperity. Indeed 
the first paragraph of Economic Development says all that is needed: Readiness to 
adapt to changing conditions is a sine qua non for economic success. The extent of 
the change envisaged in Economic Development was great – but it was not expected 
to be as unrelenting as the changes we experience today.   
 
While talk of change is easy, the reality is much more difficult, especially in large 
complex organisations, whether in the public or the private sector. Today, we have to 
accept that we are in a world that is ever changing from an economic perspective, 
fuelled by the globalisation process, by technology change, by environmental 
concerns, etc. Organisations that have no market driver for adaptability face particular 
challenges in handling change. For example, what does it mean to ‘be ready to adapt’ 
in the public sector, and how is the commitment to adaptability achieved?    
 
In the private sector, if the market generates large profits in a boom and losses in a 
recession, the government needs to recognise that it should not try to protect 
enterprises in difficulty unless there are specific reasons to do this that go beyond the 
enterprise itself.48 In the Irish context this means that, very regrettably for some 
employees, it is unwise for the government to intervene if some construction and 
property development companies are forced to close. If small companies in the private 
sector do not adapt to change in a recession, they simply fail and they fail quickly. If 
large companies do not adapt, they lose market share and profitability, and may 
ultimately fail. This has implications for employers and employees in any company – 
in a dynamic world they have a shared interest in that nothing is certain except that to 
survive they must be competitive and innovative.49 Putting it bluntly, the restrictive 
                                                 
48 The interventions of many governments across the world in the current banking crisis come to mind. 
49 The paper by Sir Alex Cairncross quoted in Chapter 1 of Economic Development, states that the 
nerve centre of the whole forward movement may lie, not in finance, but in entrepreneurial capacity.  
 
 
24 
practices of employers and employees are rapidly self-defeating in a dynamic open 
economy environment – whereas in a closed market, the speed of decline is much 
slower and those practices are less immediately costly.   
 
So the message for today in those parts of the economy where there are no market 
pressures on individuals for change is that there are huge pressures on managers to 
deliver on that change. In the public sector, the modest proposals in the recent OECD 
(2008) report should be seen as a starting point and nothing more. This discussion 
links to the final issue to be addressed. 
 
Leadership: There is much talk today of the need for leadership in Ireland to deal 
with the present challenges. Following years of Celtic-Tiger hype, there is a need now 
to counteract the rapid shift to despondency.  Such despondency was rampant in the 
1950s though at that time the situation was much worse with many families living at 
bare subsistence levels. This contrasts with the situation today where we have just 
come through almost two decades where we enjoyed a virtuous circle of growth 
reinforced by increased labour supply (through increased numbers of school leavers, 
women re-entering the workforce and immigrants). This has generated a larger 
domestic market, creating incentives for entrepreneurs to invest and in consequence 
generate increased employment and living standards. While there are still issues 
related to equality, we have clear evidence to show that deprivation and absolute 
poverty have declined very substantially since the mid-1990s.50  
 
Central to good and sustained leadership is realism – a time to face up to issues 
squarely, in contrast to recent years when the benefits of exceptionally high growth 
rates allowed us to take easier routes.51 The following are some possible actions 
where benefits could be realised, with any significant increase in public spending:  
                                                                                                                                            
 
This was really quite different from the thinking of the time in Ireland, namely, that capital constraints 
were the greatest problem but more akin to what we recognise today in terms of the need for 
entrepreneurship and innovation.   
50 This is set out in some detail in The Best of Times? The Social Impact of the Celtic Tiger, edited by 
ESRI researchers and published by the IPA in 2007.  
51 The availability of extraordinary levels of growth in tax revenues was a real problem when the 
country at large seem to have adopted an operational philosophy of ‘buying its way’ out of every tough 
problem.  
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• facing down the inefficiencies in public sector monopolies and the powers of 
vested interests (including the professional groups),  
• narrowing the gap between the rhetoric about the quality of our education 
system at every level and its reality,  
• operationalising the commitment to efficiency in the delivery of public sector 
programmes and projects, 
• facing up to the challenges of implementing regulatory regimes that will better 
serve national interests, 
• dealing with the implications of potentially large  increases in population and 
the cultural diversity that will accompany them. 
 
Leadership in the present situation is about ultimately dealing with some major 
challenges that have lain in the shadows for too long.  The loss in competitiveness is 
to the fore, as is public sector reform.  Reform is a slow process and, to keep the 
public finances on target, it may be time to question what has previously been seen as 
unquestionable, namely, that public sector salaries should be adjusted to take account 
of the government’s ‘inability to pay’, so that the pain of adjustment to the present 
global and national problems should be shared across the economy.  This would foster 
social partnership and contribute to Ireland’s regaining economic competitiveness.52    
 
We are, in the words of Economic Development at …a critical and decisive point in 
our economic affairs, and then, as now, as in 1987, both the private and public sectors 
need to take the longer view and make those decisions which will leave us in good 
stead as international markets pick up. The advantage of taking the large overview is 
that inconsistencies are avoided – but to do this tradeoffs need to be recognised, 
something which is not ever easy in a political context. 
 
 
                                                 
52 Concerns that such wage adjustments would be to the benefit of profits does not arise in the case of 
the public sector.  
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